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Abstract I want to model a finite, fallible cognitive agent who imagines that p in
the sense of mentally representing a scenario—a configuration of objects and
properties—correctly described by p. I propose to capture imagination, so under-
stood, via variably strict world quantifiers, in a modal framework including both
possible and so-called impossible worlds. The latter secure lack of classical logical
closure for the relevant mental states, while the variability of strictness captures how
the agent imports information from actuality in the imagined non-actual scenarios.
Imagination turns out to be highly hyperintensional, but not logically anarchic.
Section 1 sets the stage and impossible worlds are quickly introduced in Sect. 2.
Section 3 proposes to model imagination via variably strict world quantifiers.
Section 4 introduces the formal semantics. Section 5 argues that imagination has a
minimal mereological structure validating some logical inferences. Section 6 deals
with how imagination under-determines the represented contents. Section 7 pro-
poses additional constraints on the semantics, validating further inferences. Sec-
tion 8 describes some welcome invalidities. Section 9 examines the effects of
importing false beliefs into the imagined scenarios. Finally, Sect. 10 hints at pos-
sible developments of the theory in the direction of two-dimensional semantics.
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1 Introduction1
‘‘Imagining’’ as well as ‘‘conceiving’’ refer in this work to intentional phenomena,
intentionality being the feature of those mental states which are directed to objects
and configurations thereof, situations, or circumstances. I rely on Chalmers’ (2002)
characterization of a notion named positive conceivability: when we positively
conceive that p, we do not just assume or suppose that p, as when we make an
assumption in a mathematical proof. Rather, we represent in our mind a scenario: a
state of affairs—a configuration of objects and properties—truthfully described by
p.2
The human mind has the ability to conceive or imagine, in this sense, rich and
detailed alternatives to actuality in order to extract information from them. This has
a very pragmatic motivation. Because we cannot experience beforehand which
scenarios are or will be actual for us to face in real life, we explore them in our
mind, switching off the contribution of our current perceptual inputs. How will the
far-East financial markets react if Greece defaults? What contingency plans will you
adopt if you don’t get that research grant? Would Mr. Jones show the symptoms he
shows, had he taken arsenic? A rich literature on ‘‘rational imagination’’ in
cognitive science (Kahneman et al. 1982; Roese and Olson 1993, 1995) shows how
such mental activity improves our cognitive skills and practical performances: one
can, for instance, learn from mistaken choices without actually making them, but by
simulating them in one’s mind, exploring the consequences, and finding them
unpalatable.
That we explore the consequences means that such exercises of imagination, as
argued e.g. by Byrne (2005), have a logic: some things follow from the
hypothesized scenario, some others do not. What kind of logical framework is
suitable for investigating this phenomenon? One obvious place to look at is possible
worlds semantics for epistemic and doxastic logics. But this mainstream approach
faces a number of well-known issues, which have been grouped under the label of
‘‘logical omniscience’’.
The logical study of intentionality flourished when authors like Hintikka (1962)
realized that the techniques of possible worlds semantics could be applied to the
analysis of intentional states like knowledge, belief, cognitive information. This was
one of the success stories of philosophical logic, whose results were taken up by
linguistics, computer science, and Artificial Intelligence [see Fagin et al. (1995),
Meyer and van der Hoek (1995)]. The key insight is notorious: representational
1 Various versions of this paper, or parts thereof, have been presented between 2014 and 2015
at the University of Lund, at the Archives Poincare´ in Nancy, at the Northern Institute of Philosophy
in Aberdeen, at the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, at the University of Groningen
and at the Institute for Logic, Language and Computation in Amsterdam. I am grateful to all those who
provided comments and useful remarks, including three anonymous referees. The paper draws on ideas
from Berto (2014); in particular, Sect. 4 relies on a formalism introduced in Sect. 2 of that work.
2 Rationalists like Descartes made a lot of a distinction between conceiving and imagining (think of his
famous example of the chiliagon); whereas empiricists like Hume blurred it. I will use ‘‘conceiving’’ and
‘‘imagining’’ broadly as synonyms for the aforesaid mental act of representing a scenario verifying a
sentence or proposition. In particular, the imagined scenario need not be perforce visually imaginable: it
may, for instance, involve abstract objects.
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mental states are modelled as restricted (agent-indexed) quantifiers over worlds.
Cognitive agent x r’s that p, r being the relevant representational mental state
(knows, believes, is informed that), when p holds throughout a set of worlds
compatible with x’s evidence, overall beliefs, etc. Accessibility relations single out
the scenarios x entertains. Let R be one such accessibility: ‘‘wRw1’’ means ‘‘World
w1 is an epistemic alternative for world w’’. Read ‘‘rp’’ as ‘‘It is represented
[believed, known, etc.] that p’’. Then the (non-agent-indexed) truth conditions forr
are (‘‘iff’’ = ‘‘if and only if’’):
‘rp’ is true at w iff p is true at all w1, such that wRw1:
Some authors have applied this framework specifically to the treatment of
imagination as a modal operator (Niiniluoto 1985; Costa Leite 2010; Wansing
2015). However, if one characterizes representational mental states by using a
standard possible worlds framework, these come out closed under logical
consequence or entailment:
(Closure) If rp, and p entails q, then rq.
Agents represent (know, believe, imagine) all the logical consequences of what
they represent. In particular, all logically valid formulae are represented:
(Validity) If p is valid, then rp.
And mental states are perforce consistent:
(Consistency) :(rp ^ r :p).
Such principles hold in the weakest normal modal logic K (for Consistency, just
add the seriality D-principle). They follow precisely from interpreting epistemic
operators as quantifiers over possible (logically closed, maximally consistent)
worlds. There is universal consensus (see e.g. Meyer and van der Hoek 1995,
Sect. 2.5) that they deliver implausibly idealized mental states. We experience
having (perhaps covert) inconsistent beliefs. Excluded Middle is (suppose) valid,
but intuitionists do not believe it. We know basic arithmetic truths like Peano’s
postulates; and these entail (suppose) Goldbach’s conjecture; but we don’t know
whether Goldbach’s conjecture is true. The cognitive agency so modelled has little
to do with human intelligence.
Wansing (2015) nicely discusses Niiniluoto (1985) and Costa Leite (2010)’s
works on imagination in this respect. Wansing himself uses neighbourhood
semantics from minimal models (see Chellas 1989, Part III) for his own logic and
semantics of imagination. This allows several logical closure properties to fail for it:
for instance, that one imagines that if p then q, and one imagines that p, does not
entail that one imagines that q. However, it is still the case that if p is equivalent to q
(the two come out true in the same worlds in all interpretations, so ’p iff q’ is
logically valid), and one imagines that p, one imagines that q and vice versa. This
may be questioned. Even in logics much weaker than classical logic, e.g., weak
relevant logics, p is equivalent to p _ (p ^ q). However, one may imagine that p
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without imagining that p _ (p ^ q); for instance, q may include expressions for
concepts the conceiving agent simply does not possess.3
Logical omniscience is clearly connected to the topic of hyperintensionality. One
can take H as a hyperintensional operator when Hp and Hq may have different truth
values, even if p and q are necessarily or logically equivalent. Now intentional states
seem to draw distinctions between intensionally (necessarily) equivalent contents:
rp may differ in truth value from rq even when p and q are logically equivalent.
The possible worlds apparatus can only draw intensional, not hyperintensional,
distinctions. Thus it cannot easily model conceivability and connected doxastic and
informational notions. Among the approaches to hyperintensionality in the logical
literature, possibly the most interesting are Tichy’s Transparent Intensional Logic
(Duzˇı´ et al. 2010) and structuralist accounts of content (King 1996). Each faces
troubles (see e.g. Ripley 2012; Jago 2014, for a set of thorough objections to
structuralism).
This work aims at modelling imagination as a hyperintensional mental state,
while retaining the thought that similar states are restricted quantifiers on worlds,
thereby preserving the key insight of world semantics. The two core ideas behind
the approach are: (1) to expand the worlds apparatus by adding so-called non-
normal or impossible worlds; and (2) to model acts of imagining or conceiving as
variably strict world quantifiers. The first idea has been already explored in
epistemic and doxastic logic, but never applied to imagination4; I introduce it in
Sect. 2 below. The second idea is new; I introduce it in Sect. 3.
2 Impossible Worlds
If possible worlds are ways things could be, then non-normal or impossible worlds
are ways things could not be: they represent some absolute impossibility as being
the case.5 What we take to be absolutely impossible depends on what we take to be
absolutely necessary, that is, to hold across the total modal space of possible worlds.
Logical and mathematical necessity are at times taken as candidates for
absoluteness. To them, some add metaphysical necessity (e.g., the necessity that
Hesperus be Phosphorus). Not much hinges on this in what follows. The impossible
worlds we are going to employ only represent failures of logical necessity. And, as
3 I should mention another feature of Wansing’s approach: it combines neighbourhood semantics with a
‘‘stit’’ logic of agency (see Belnap et al. 2001; Horty 2001). I find this strategy very promising: it allows
to model the agentive role of imagination, namely the idea that acts of imagination are what agents
voluntarily set out to do. It might be that a stit framework is embeddable in the one I propose below.
4 Though I found an anticipation in cognitive science research by Nichols and Stich (2003). They
propose a model of imagination and mental simulation based on a ‘‘possible world box’’, where we store
the contents of our acts of imagining, and which gets integrated via the importation of relevant beliefs into
the imagined scenarios. In a footnote, they claim: ‘‘We are using the term ‘possible world’ more broadly
than it is often used in philosophy [...], because we want to be able to include descriptions of worlds that
many would consider impossible. For instance, we want to allow that the Possible World Box can contain
a representation with the content There is a greatest prime number.’’ (Ibid: 28).
5 For a quick introduction, see Berto (2013). For an application to the ontology of fiction, see Berto
(2008).
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we will see, the formal framework I will propose can be fine-tuned in such a way
that the logic at issue is fully classical. Then the relevant impossibilities turn out to
be violations of classical logic (more precisely, of the normal propositional modal
logic S5).6
The idea of using non-normal worlds to model intentional states has been pursued
in epistemic logic since Rantala (1982), and later on by authors such as Priest (2005)
and Jago (2014). These worlds are understood as viable epistemic alternatives for
limited and fallible cognitive agents. The intentional operators characterised via
them are still taken, as in the standard approach, as modals: (restricted) quantifiers
over worlds. But by accessing non-normal worlds in the truth conditions of the
relevant r, one easily refutes Validity, Closure and Consistency. For instance,
Closure: take a non-normal world w where p holds, but p v q fails. If w is accessible
(to the relevant agent), we haverp withoutr(p v q), although p logically entails p
v q. For Consistency: access a non-normal world where both p and :p hold to get
rp and r:p. Wansing (1990) proved that non-normal worlds semantics provide a
very comprehensive framework for epistemic logics, within which other
approaches, for instance, syntactic ones in which the cognitive states of agents
are taken as sets of sentences (Eberle 1974; Fagin and Halpern 1988), can be
recaptured.
All of this has already been done. In this paper I want to apply the techniques of
impossible worlds semantics specifically to the logic of imagination for finite and
fallible conceiving agents. I approach this via an issue which is symmetric to the
problem of logical omniscience. On the one hand, our imagination should
sometimes be inconsistent, and/or not closed under entailment: we do not conceive
everything that follows from what we explicitly imagine, and we can occasionally
have inconsistent conceptions. But on the other hand, it is another manifest fact of
our inner mental life that we do imagine things not logically entailed by what is
explicitly included in the mental act of imagining a scenario. I think that impossible
worlds can help with this as well. The first question we need to ask is: what does
‘‘explicit’’ mean here?
3 Ceteris Paribus Imagination
When we engage in a conscious act of imagination whereby we conceive a scenario,
such an act has some deliberate basis: we set out to target a given content. Call such
content explicit. Byrne (2005) reports a number of experiments carried out by
cognitive scientists, showing how imagination has such a deliberate component,
whereby we focus on a limited number of non-actual possibilities, directly
represented in our mind (a similar view is advocated in Nichols and Stich 2003). For
instance: x reads one of Arthur Conan Doyle’s novels, portraying Sherlock Holmes
as a man who is variously active in London, so-and-so dressed, doing this and that.
On the basis of the input overtly given in the text, x starts forming a mental
representation of the situation described there.
6 Thanks to an anonymous referee for prompting me to clarify this.
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When we engage in such exercises we do not limit ourselves to the information
we explicitly represent in our minds, or to what we can unpack from it via pure
logic. London actually is in the UK and normally endowed men have kidneys, even
if Doyle’s stories (assume) do not claim this explicitly. Now x can take such facts as
holding throughout the represented situation, absent information to the contrary:
x does imagine Holmes as a normally endowed man with kidneys and as living in
the UK. This integration is typical: we do not conceive such additional details by
inferring them logically from the explicitly given content, rather by importing
background information we already have, and which we retain in the non-actual
scenario we build a mental representation of.
Then in such exercises of imagination we do both less and more than applying
end-to-end a fixed set of logical rules of inference. We do less, in the sense that we
don’t draw all the logical consequences of what we explicitly conceive. That is the
non-omniscience side of the story. But we also do more, because we enlarge our
imagined scenarios by importing what does not follow logically from their explicit
content. As Timothy Williamson claimed in The Philosophy of Philosophy, we
should then avoid looking for smooth logical rules governing such exercises in their
entirety:
Calling [the relevant conceiving] ‘‘inferential’’ is no longer very informative.
[...] To call the new judgment ‘‘inferential’’ simply because it is not made
independently of all the thinker’s prior beliefs or suppositions is to stretch the
term ‘‘inferential’’ beyond its useful span. At any rate, the judgment cannot be
derived from the prior beliefs or suppositions purely by the application of
general rules of inference. (Williamson 2007: 147 and 151)
What Williamson is in the business of explaining here is his approach to the
epistemology of metaphysical modality, which has been labelled as ‘‘counterfac-
tual’’ (Vaidya 2015). According to Williamson, we come to know absolute
(metaphysical) necessities via counterfactual thoughts, so that such knowledge can
be explained as a special case of our coming to know things via counterfactual
imagination. Williamson does not adopt a specific formal semantics for counter-
factuals, but in the mainstream one—the possible worlds framework of conditional
logics by Stalnaker (1968) and Lewis (1973)—these are understood as variably
strict modal conditionals. Similarly, we propose to model imagination via modal
operators interpreted as variably strict quantifiers over worlds, possible and
impossible. Adding impossible worlds accounts for our imagining absolute
impossibilities and inconsistencies and for the lack of (classical) logical closure
of our mental states. The variability of strictness is to account for the (highly
contextual) selection of the information we import in a representational mental act
when we integrate its explicit content. The explicit content itself will play a role
similar to that of a variably strict, or ceteris paribus, conditional antecedent. What is
actually imagined, then, is what holds in worlds where the antecedent holds and
further information imported from actuality holds, too.
The closest to this proposal I found in the philosophical literature is Lewis’
(1978) famous paper on truth in fiction. Here the key idea was that ‘‘we can help
ourselves to the notion of what is explicitly so according to the fiction and use the
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notion of possible worlds to extend outwards and define what is implicitly so’’
(Sainsbury 2010: 76). The explicit fictional content corresponds to the explicit
content of our imagined scenarios, and works, in Lewis’ approach, too, like the
antecedent of a ceteris paribus conditional. Williamson similarly claims:
We seem to have a prereflective tendency to minimum alteration in imagining
counterfactual alternatives to actuality, reminiscent of the role that similarity
between possible worlds plays in the Lewis–Stalnaker semantics. (Williamson
2007: 151)
Later on I will come to the topic of world similarity. We first need to make the
idea of ceteris paribus imagination formally more precise.
4 Formal Semantics
Take a sentential language L with atoms p, q, r ðp1; p2; :::Þ, negation :, conjunction
^, disjunction _, conditional!, modalsh and , square and round brackets [ and ],
( and ). The round brackets are auxiliary symbols for scope disambiguation. The
square brackets allow the formation of sententially indexed modals. I use meta-
variables A, B, C ðA1;A2; . . .Þ for formulas of L. The well-formed formulas are the
atoms and, if A and B are formulas:
:AjðA^BÞjðA_BÞjðA ! BÞjhAjAj½AB
(Outermost brackets are usually omitted). Things of the form ‘‘[A]’’ are to be
thought of as modal operators indexed by formulas (the idea, in the context of
conditional logics, goes back to Chellas 1975; see also Segerberg 1989). Take a
bunch of acts of imagining, performed by a given conceiving agent on specific
occasions. Suppose each is characterized by an explicit content, to be directly
expressed by a formula of L: this is what we intentionally set out to imagine when
we engage in the act. Let the set of formulas expressing possible acts be K. Each A
2 K has its own operator, [A]. One can read ‘‘[A]B’’ as: ‘‘It is imagined in act A that
B’’; or, less briefly and more accurately: ‘‘It is imagined in the act whose explicit
content is A, that B’’. We can call our [A]’s ‘‘imagination operators’’.7
An interpretation for L is a tuple\P, I, @, {RA|A 2 K}, [. P is the set of
possible worlds; I is the set of impossible worlds; P \ I = ;; W = P [ I is the totality
of worlds; @ 2 P is the actual world; {RA|A 2 K} is a set of binary accessibilities on
W, RA  W x W: each A 2 K fixes its own accessibility, RA. Finally,  is a pair
\þ, [ of relations between items in W and formulas: ‘‘w ?A’’ says that A is
true at world w, ‘‘w –A’’ says that A is false there. Each interpretation relates
7 Intentional operators are usually agent-indexed: in the notation of epistemic logics, ‘‘Kx A’’ means that
cognitive agent x knows/believes that A. But the subscript would not have done much work in our setting,
which is essentially single-agent: imagination takes place in the private of one’s mind. So we are omitting
it. This does not rule out possible developments of the theory into a multi-agent logic of imagination, as in
Nichols and Stich (2003)’s ‘‘mindreading’’ perspective, where agents try to imagine what other agents are
imagining.
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atoms to truth and falsity at worlds and is extended to the whole L as follows. For all
w 2 P:
(S:1) w ? :A iff w –A
(S:2) w – :A iff w ?A
(S_1) w ?A _ B iff w ?A or w ?B
(S_2) w –A _ B iff w –A and w –B
(S^1) w ?A ^ B iff w ?A and w ?B
(S^2) w –A ^ B iff w –A or w –B
As for the modals, for all w 2 P:
(Sh1) w ?hA iff for all w12 P, w1?A
(Sh2) w – hA iff for some w12 P, w1–A
(S1) w ?A iff for some w12 P, w1?A
(S2) w – A iff for all w12 P, w1–A
Unrestricted necessity/possibility at possible worlds is truth at all/some possible
world(s). We have a strict conditional. For all w2 P:
(S!1) w ?A ! B iff for all w12P, if w1?A, then w 1 ?B.
(S!2) w –A ! B iff for some w12 P, w1?A and w1–B.
Finally we come to [A]. For w2 P:
(S[A]1) w ?[A]B iff for all w12 W such that wRAw1, w1?B
(S[A]2) w – [A]B iff for some w12 W such that wRAw1, w1 –B
Read ‘‘wRAw1’’ as saying that w1 realizes the content of an intentional state
obtaining at w: things are at w1 as they are represented at w, in the act of imagination
whose explicit content is expressed by A. Because the RA’s access impossible
worlds, as we will see, we can have various hyperintensional distinctions we want
acts of imagination to be able to make.
The truth and falsity conditions for [A] above may also be expressed using set-
selection functions, similarly to what Lewis does in Counterfactuals (see Lewis
1973: 57–59). These work as follows: each A 2 K comes with a function, f A. This
takes as input the world w where the act of imagination obtains and outputs the set
of worlds accessed via that act: f A(w) ={w12W|wRAw1}. Let |A| be the set of worlds
where A is true. Then for w 2 P:
(S[A]1) w ?[A]B iff f A(w) |B|
(S[A]2) w – [A]B iff f A(w) \|:B| 6¼ ;
So [A]B is true (false) at w iff B is true at all worlds (false at some world) in a set
selected by f A. Because wRAw1 iff w1 2 f A(w), the formulation in terms of
accessibility and the one in terms of set-selection functions are perfectly
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interchangeable. However, it will sometimes be easier to make a point using either
formulation rather than the other.
The recursive truth conditions have been defined for points in P. At points in I all
complex formulas are treated as if they were atoms, in that they are related to truth
values directly, not recursively. So for w 2 I we can have, for instance, w?A _ B
even if it is not the case that w?A or that w?B (impossible worlds can be
nonprime); w?A together with w? :A (impossible worlds can be inconsistent);
etc.
Logical consequence is truth preservation at the base-actual world in all
interpretations. Where S is a set of formulas:
S  A iff, in every interpretation\P, I, @, {RA|A 2 K}, [, if @ ?B for all B 2
S, then @ ?A.
As a special case, logical validity is truth at the actual world in all interpretations:
 A iff ;  A, that is, in every interpretation\P, I, @, {RA|A 2 K}, [, @ ?A.
There is nothing telling @ apart from any other possible world with respect to the
definitions of logical truth and consequence. However, @’s being flagged in our
interpretations will come handy for later considerations. What matters is that @ 2 P,
for ‘‘impossible worlds are only a figment of the agents’ imagination: they serve only
at epistemic alternatives. Thus, logical implication and validity are determined solely
with respect to the standard worlds’’ (Fagin et al. 1995: 358). If we understand
impossible worlds as ‘‘worlds where logic may be different’’, this sounds natural: we
want to define logical consequencewith respect toworldswhere logic is not different.8
The attentive reader will already have guessed why truth and falsity conditions
have been given separately in the semantics: we want to model imaginable
inconsistencies, so we allow some formulas to be both true and false, or ‘‘glutty’’, at
some worlds (also, neither true nor false, or ‘‘gappy’’). However, one may not want
this to happen at possible worlds: their being maximally consistent is what makes
them possible, one may say. To accommodate this, one can restrict attention to
interpretations of L which comply with a Classicality Condition on possible worlds:
(CC) If w 2 P, then for each p, either w ?p or w –p, but not both.
The CC generalizes, by easy induction on their complexity, to formulas not
including imagination operators. To extend the CC to the whole language, though,
8 It is sometimes claimed that impossible worlds semantics alters the meaning of the logical vocabulary
(a nice discussion is in Jago 2007). This is connected to the understanding of non-normal worlds as points
where ‘‘logic may be different’’: a world where a contradiction, p ^ :p, is true, one may say, is one
where that formula does not express the proposition that p and not-p. However, the semantics above does
validate the Law of Non-Contradiction and furthermore (when fixed in a way we are about to explain)
provides no counterexamples to it. A world where a contradiction is true is a way things could not be
according to the (amended) semantics; but a way things could be is someone’s conceiving a contradiction,
that is, imagining a scenario in which it obtains, and impossible worlds have the role of modelling such
acts of imagination. Dialetheists like Graham Priest (1987) believe that the actual world is inconsistent,
and it is controversial whether they are thereby automatically misunderstanding the meaning of negation
(or that of conjunction). Williamson (2007) defends the view that they are not.
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we need to rephrase (S[A]2), the falsity conditions for the latter, for their clauses
allow one to look at impossible worlds. This is easily done: for instance, to avoid
glutty acts of imagination bouncing back into real world inconsistencies, one just
needs: w – [A]B iff not w  ?[A]B.
Once this is done, the logic induced by the semantics for the connectives other
than the imagination operators is simply the normal propositional modal logic S5.
However, the framework is flexible enough to model also weaker non-classical
logics as the base logic, e.g., (modal extensions of) paracomplete and paraconsistent
logics (this is one motivation for phrasing the semantics in terms of truth and falsity
conditions separately: see Priest (2005), Ch. 1, where the same strategy is adopted).
What we will discuss from now on, is how the logic of our imagination operators
is to work. The framework for the discussion will be model-theoretic: we will
investigate the opportunity of adding conditions on interpretations, involving the
RA’s or f A’s—the indexed accessibilities—for those operators.
5 The Mereology of Imagination
The first conditions I want to propose for our imagination operators involve
conjunction. It seems to me that, when one imagines that a conjunction is the case,
one also imagines each conjunct: you cannot imagine that Sherlock Holmes is a
bachelor and lives in London without imagining that Sherlock Holmes is a bachelor.
The following condition on accessibilities:
(Simplification) If w2 P, then if wRAw 1 then (if w1?B ^ C, then w 1 ?B
and w1?C)
... Gives the following validities:
[A](B ^ C)  [A]B
[A](B ^ C)  [A]C
(Proof: suppose @ ?[A](B ^ C). By (S[A]1), for all w 2W such that @RAw, w
? B ^ C. Because @ 2 P, Simplification applies: for any such w, w ?B and w
?C. By (S[A]1) again, @ ?[A]B and @ ?[A]C).
The companion constraint to Simplification is:
(Adjunction) If w 2 P, then if wRAw1 then (if w1 ?B and w1?C, then w1?
B ^ C)
This gives us:
[A]B, [A]C  [A](B ^ C)
(Proof: suppose @ ?[A]B and @ ?[A]C. By (S[A]1), for all w 2 W such that
@ RAw, w ? B and w ? C. Because @ 2 P, Adjunction applies: for any such w,
w ? B ^ C. By (S[A]1) again, @ ?[A](B ^ C)).
If Simplification and Adjunction are accepted, imaginative accessibility is de
facto limited to worlds which are, so to speak, fully well-mannered with respect to
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conjunction. However, Adjunction might look especially controversial. Is it so that,
when one imagines in one act [A] that B and that C, one automatically imagines that
B ^ C? This is the counterpart of a question that has been asked for counterfactuals,
namely whether different counterfactuals with the same antecedent allow for
conjunction of their consequents, given the role consequents play in fixing the
context of evaluation. We can in fact adapt to our imagination operators the very
story that Quine (1960): 222 used for making the point concerning counterfactuals.
The situation one sets out to imagine, [A], involves Caesar the Roman emperor
being in command of the US troops in the Korean war. Given the same explicit
content as input (say, a time travel science fiction story), one can imagine Caesar
using the atom bomb, B, or one can imagine that he resorts to catapults, C. If one
imports into the representation information concerning the weapons available in the
Twentieth Century, one can imagine that Caesar drops the bomb in Korea, [A]B. If
one rather allows the Roman military apparatus to step in, one can imagine Caesar
dropping stones to the Reds via catapults, [A]C. However, one would not thereby
have [A](B ^ C), Caesar employing both the bomb and catapults. Of course, one can
imagine that as well (making the scenario even weirder). But the point is that it
should not come automatically, as a logical entailment.
However, I believe that something has gone wrong in this reconstruction of the
situation. We are considering individual acts of imagining, but we individuate them
only via their explicit content. But different acts of imagining the same explicit content
can trigger the import of different background information depending on contexts (the
time and place atwhich the cognitive agent performs the act, the status of its background
information, etc.). Now it seems clear that there is a shift in context in the Quinean
example. So I think that Adjunction can be maintained by fixing some contextual
parameter. The formalism may represent this, if wanted, by adding a set of contexts to
the interpretations, variables ranging on them in the language, and by directly indexing
representational acts with contexts: ½Ax, ½Ay , for instance, will stand for two distinct
acts with the same explicit content, A, performed in contexts x and y. Once the
adjunctive inference is parameterized to same-indexed contents, it should work fine.
But this is just the technical fix. The philosophical point behind Simplification
and Adjunction is that imagined contents (of the kind we are addressing), however
logically anarchic, have some minimal mereological structure. Let me explain what
is meant by this.
Recall that we are not modelling the mere assumption or supposition of some
content p, but more substantive (in Chalmers’ jargon) positive conceivability—
someone’s bringing to one’s mind a mental scenario: a state of affairs, or a
configuration of objects and properties, which verifies p. One can assume or suppose
that p in a proof, without perforce representing in the mind a state of affairs
verifying p. One may then suppose (in this sense) a conjunction without supposing
the conjuncts separately, or vice versa.
But configurations of objects and properties, or states of affairs, seem to allow for
constituent parts (again, they need not be spatial parts: the scenarios may involve
abstract objects having no spatial extension, or properties which do not involve
spatiality). A state of affairs such that object o is P and object o is Q includes as
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constituents the state of affairs such that o is P, and the state of affairs such that o is
Q. Next, it seems to me, when one positively imagines a whole scenario or state of
affairs, it appears that one automatically imagines its constitutive parts. I cannot
imagine that Holmes is a bachelor living in London without imagining Holmes as a
bachelor, and without imagining him as living in London, for the last two contents
are just constituents of the scenario I am imagining. Vice versa, if I imagine Holmes
as a bachelor and I imagine Holmes as living in London in the very same act of
imagination (that is, modulo the fixing of context as per above), then I imagine both
things together, for they are constitutive parts of the same content.
If we can conceive blatantly impossible scenarios like a round square (which
might be controversial, but let us assume it for the sake of the argument), the same
may hold for them. If I can somehow positively conceive something’s being round
and square, the relevant scenario will be a configuration of objects and properties,
such that something has the property of being round, and that thing has the property
of being square. But then I will have already conceived that the thing is round, and I
will have already conceived that the thing is square (and vice versa, modulo the
contextual indexing to a single act of imagination). The proposal that positive
imagination be well-behaved with respect to conjunction is a way to mirror this fact
in our formal semantics: positive imagination involves representing a scenario or a
state of affairs, and scenarios or states of affairs can have parts. When we conceive
the whole of a scenario, we conceive its parts. When we conceive the parts in the
same act of imagination, we conceive the whole.
I should anyway add that, if one still does not agree, the formal framework of
Sect. 4 can easily accommodate non-simplifying and/or non-adjunctive exercises of
imagination: one simply does not accept Simplification and/or Adjunction as
conditions on interpretations. Much (though not all) of the subsequent discussion on
other inferential features of our imagination operators goes on unaltered.9
6 The Under-Determinacy of Imagination
If some dual story with respect to what has been said for ^ could be told for _, we
may limit accessibility for our imagination operators to impossible worlds which are
well-behaved with respect to disjunction too. Our impossible worlds, then, would be
like the worlds used in relevant logics such as Belnap and Dunn’s First Degree
Entailment (Dunn 1976; Belnap 1977): worlds which can be locally glutty or gappy,
but are always adjunctive and prime.
Now it is intuitive that the contents of our acts of imagination ought to be under-
determined. When one imagines a situation, one does not normally represent all its
9 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this. It is worth remarking that some literature from
cognitive psychology corroborates the view that mental imagery has a mereological structure
implemented in the mind (though the point is controversial: see e.g. Pylyshyn 2002). This can also be
a quasi-spatial structure, when one imagines physical situations. There are experiments which show that,
on average, it takes more time to explore in the mind the parts of an imagined situation with constituents
relatively apart from each other, or which are themselves conceived as mereologically complex, then
those of more compact or simpler situations (see e.g. Shepard and Cooper 1982; Kosslyn 1980, 1994).
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details. If one sets out to imagine how the European leaders are debating on the future
of Greece in Brussels, one thinks of a complex situation involving bilateral meetings,
conferences, etc. One does not imagine the details, but one wants the details to be
there, in a sense. One does not imagine Brussels brick by brick, but that does not
mean that in one’s mind Brussels is a de re vague object with an indeterminate
number of bricks. That is, one would not allow moving from the under-determinacy
of one’s representation to the under-determinacy of the represented objects
themselves. Either the overall number of bricks composing the Brussels buildings
is even, or it is odd; but one does not imagine Brussels either way. So we need to be
able to have representational acts such that [A](B _ C) does not entail [A]B _ [A]C.
Again, our operators mirror what happens with ceteris paribus conditionals. As
Stalnaker claimed, the ‘‘situations determined by the antecedents of counterfactual
conditionals are like the imaginary worlds created by writers of fiction’’, in that ‘‘in
both cases, one purports to represent and describe a unique determinate [...] world,
even though one never really succeeds in doing so’’ (Stalnaker 1981: 95).
However, to achieve this we do not need nonprime worlds such that w ?A _ B
but neither w ?A nor w ?B. What does justice to under-determinacy in
imagination is the plurality of worlds accessed via RA or f A : different worlds fill up
the unspecified details in different ways. You imagine Angela Merkel signing
documents in Brussels, A. Merkel is either left-handed, L, or right-handed, R (or
ambidextrous), and you import this by default in the imagined scenario: for all
worlds, w, such that @ RAw, w ? R _ L; thus, @ ? [A](R _ L). But you have no
idea which one actually is the case. So there will be accessible worlds that do not
have Merkel left-handed, and accessible worlds that do not have her right-handed.
Then we have neither @ ? [A]R nor @ ? [A]L.
Although our accessible impossible worlds need not misbehave with respect to
disjunction in order to model under-determinacy, they need to misbehave for
another reason. If the truth and falsity conditions for disjunction above held for all
worlds, the following would be valid (while it shouldn’t):
[A]B ?[A](B _ C)
(Proof: suppose @ ?[A]B. By (S[A]1), for all w 2 W such that @ RAw,
w ? B. If (S_1) held at all worlds, we would have w ?B _ C. And by (S[A]1)
again, @ ?[A](B _ C)). Now this cannot be: when one imagines in the act whose
explicit content is A, that B, one does not thereby imagine a disjunction between B
and an arbitrary C (you imagine Holmes in London and you imagine him in
England, but it does not follow that you imagine that either Holmes is in England or
Watson is a jelly fish).
7 Further Conditions, and the Issue of Similarity
The Lewis–Stalnaker semantics for ceteris paribus conditionals is based on a notion
of closeness between worlds, which is universally understood as similarity.
Roughly: a conditional of this kind, let us say, a subjunctive ‘‘If it were the case that
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A, then it would be the case that B’’, is true at w iff the world(s) most similar to
w where A holds also make true B. However, world similarity has been variously
criticized as a desperately vague and context-dependent notion. Some have tried to
make the notion viable in Artificial Intelligence (Delgrande 1988). But things seem
to get worse when worlds representing absolute impossibilities are around. How
does similarity work for them? Supposing mathematical necessity is unrestricted, is
a world where the Axiom of Choice fails closer than one where Fermat’s Last
Theorem is false? One can find some work on the topic (Nolan 1997; Brogaard and
Salerno 2013; Bjerring 2014), but there is as yet no mainstream approach to the
issue.
Jago (2014)’s theory of impossible worlds allows a distinction between obvious
and subtle logical impossibilities via a total ordering of impossible worlds with
respect to the degree of complexity of the logical truths violated at them. I think that
Jago’s techniques may be used to provide some kind of logical similarity metric for
impossible worlds. The approach has found critics: see Bjerring (2013) (Bjerring
2014 also has a promising positive proposal: an alternative framework for an
extended Lewis–Stalnaker semantics including impossible worlds).
However, I would like to leave this idea as work to be developed in a further
paper. We can discuss some additional conditions for the semantics of our
imagination operators, without taking a stance on world similarity. We can impose
direct constraints on the RA’s or f A’s without presupposing a metric for world
closeness, or nested similarity spheres, similarly to what happens with the ceteris
paribus conditionals of weak conditional logics such as C? [see Priest (2008):
87–90].
Here is one basic constraint:
(Obtaining) If w 2 P, then f A(w) |A|
Possible worlds only access worlds where the explicit content obtains. Obtaining
gives this logical validity:
 [A]A
It is obvious that one imagines what one explicitly imagines.10 As a special case:
 [A ^ B](A ^ B)
And via Simplification:
 [A ^ B]A
Next, one condition I am inclined to buy is, as we will call it, the Principle of
Imaginative Equivalents:
(PIE) If f A(w) |B| and f B(w) |A|, then f A(w) = f B(w).
10 The restriction to items in P in Obtaining is needed because, otherwise, with nested conceiving (one
imagines that one imagines that), we get  [A]([B]B): whatever one explicitly imagines, one imagines
that what one explicitly imagines, one imagines—which sounds bad.
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If all the worlds selected by f A make B true and vice versa, then A and B are
‘‘imaginative equivalents’’: when we set out to imagine either, we look at the same
set of circumstances. (PIE) validates the following inference:
(Substitutivity) [A]B, [B]A, [B]C  [A]C
(Proof: suppose [A]B, [B]A, [B]C are all true at @. By (S[A]1), the first entails
that f A(@) |B|, the second that f B(@) |A|, the third that f B(@) |C|. Applying
(PIE) to the first two of these, we get f A(@) = f B(@). Thus, f A(@) |C|, from which,
by (S[A]1) again, we get @ ?[A]C).
Substitutivity says that two imaginative equivalents A and B can be replaced
salva veritate with each other as the explicit content of a representational act. Given
the number of hyperintensional distinctions we can make in our imagination, there
might be very few imaginative equivalents for a given agent. But suppose that
bachelor and unmarried man are for you imaginative equivalents: you are so aware
of their meaning the same thing, that you can’t imagine someone being one thing
without imagining him being the other. Thus, [A]B: when you explicitly imagine
Holmes as unmarried, you imagine him as a bachelor; and [B]A: when you explicitly
imagine Holmes as a bachelor, you imagine him unmarried. Suppose [B]C: as you
explicitly imagine Holmes as a bachelor, you imagine him happy; it follows that the
same happens when you imagine him unmarried.
(PIE) licenses another inference I am tentatively inclined to accept. I will call it
Special Transitivity11:
(ST) [A]B, [A ^ B]C  [A]C
(Proof: suppose (1) @ ?[A]B and (2) @ ?[A ^ B]C. From (1) and [A]A
(secured by Obtaining as valid), via Adjunction, we get @ ?[A](A ^ B). [A ^ B]A
is valid (from  [A ^ B](A ^ B), via Simplification), so @ ?[A ^ B]A. Applying
(S[A]1), to the last two we get f A(@) |A ^ B| and f A^B(@) |A|. By (PIE), f A(@)
= f A^B(@). From (2), by (S[A]1) again, f A^B(@) |C|. From this and the previous
identity, f A(@) |C|. From this via (S[A]1) again, @ ?[A]C).
Now Special Transitivity has some very good instances. [A]B: when you imagine
yourself winning the lottery, you imagine yourself having a lot of money. [A ^ B]C:
when you imagine yourself winning the lottery and having a lot of money, you
imagine yourself happy. Thus, [A]C: when you imagine yourself winning the
lottery, you imagine yourself happy. And I can think of no intuitive counterexam-
ples. But that does not mean none could be found, of course (hence the ‘‘tentatively’’
above).
Having looked at what is (tentatively) valid in our semantics, let us see what is
(interestingly) invalid. Quite a lot, it turns out.
11 General Transitivity fails for our operators, just as it does for ceteris paribus conditionals. Its failure is
a consequence of the failure of Antecedent Strengthening, to which we are about to come.
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8 Invalidities
Ceteris paribus conditionals are, notoriously, non-monotonic in that Antecedent
Strengthening fails from them: a counterfactual ‘‘If it were the case that A, then it
would be the case that B’’ does not entail ‘‘If it were the case that A & C, then it
would be the case that B’’. Our imagination operators inherit such a nice feature, for
the following is invalid in the semantics:
[A]B 2 [A ^ C]B
(Counterexample: suppose @ Rp-accesses nothing. Then @ ?[p]q. Let @
Rp^rw (w may be possible, or not), w ?p ^ r but not w ?q. Then it is not the case
that @ ?[p ^ r]q).12 An act of imagination (in a given context) is individuated by
its explicit content. And one cannot indiscriminately import further information into
the explicit content itself without turning it into a different act. You imagine that
you fail your logic class, and you will imagine yourself in a sad mood. But if you
imagine failing your logic class and that everyone else has failed, so that the exam
needs to be re-taken with an easier array of exercises, your mood will not be that sad
in such a scenario. What does the trick is the fact that f A(w) need not be the same as
f A^C(w). The variability in the strictness of our operators is the essential tool
securing such non-monotonicity of our exercises of imagination.
Next, here is one invalidity essentially involving the hyperintensional features of
our operators:
A ! B 2 [A]B
(Counterexample: let all w 2 P be such that not w ? p. Then @ ?p ! q. For
some w1 2 I, let @ Rpw1, w1? p but not w1 ? q. Then not @ ? [p]q). Recall that
the premise is an intensional (strict) conditional: all the possible A-worlds are B-
worlds. However, in an act of imagination whose explicit content is given by A, we
do not automatically imagine that B: as our act is hyperintensional, that is, it
discriminates between various absolute impossibilities, we may look at impossible
A-worlds where B fails. In particular, strict conditionals which logicians in the
tradition of relevant logics (see Mares 2004 for a nice introduction) call
‘‘irrelevant’’, such as conditionals which hold just because the antecedent is
impossible, or the consequent necessary, do not imply the corresponding irrelevant
conceivings. In our semantics, this is fine:
(A ^ :A) ! B
However, this fails:
2 [A ^ :A]B
12 I use sentential letters, p, q, ... , for invalidity arguments, for to show invalidity we present a counter-
model assigning truth values to particular formulas. I use the schematic meta-variables for formulas, A, B,
... , for validity arguments, for there one argues for the validity of any instance of the relevant schema (as
in Priest (2008): 10–11).
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(Just let w 2 I, @ Rp^:pw, w ?p ^ :p but not w ?q). That we explicitly
imagine an inconsistent scenario does not mean that we trivialize our act of
imagination. Similarly, although we have:
 A ! (B ! B)
the counterpart for imagination fails:
2 [A](B ! B)
(Let w 2 I, @ Rpw, w ?p but not w ?q ! q). In general, we can discriminate
between logical or absolute necessities and we do not conceive them automatically,
independently of what we (explicitly) conceive. Thanks to impossible worlds, we
have:
hB 2 [A]B
:A 2 [A]B
9 Modus Ponens in Imagination
To discuss the plausibility of one further constraint, we need to introduce the notion
of cotenability. This is the connection that, by holding between some information
and a formula, A, makes the information eligible to be imported into the act of
imagination whose explicit content is given by A (the term was used by Lewis
(1973) in the context of counterfactuals; he took it from Goodman). [A]B will hold
(at a world) when the explicitly imagined content, A, plus a ceteris paribus clause,
say, CA, dependent on A and cotenable with A (at that world), entails B. CA is not an
ordinary premise or set of premises, but works rather like a catch-all ceteris paribus
clause: it captures the background information we hold fixed relative to A, and
which we can import into our imagined scenario.13
Now so far we generically referred to what is imported in our exercises of ceteris
paribus imagination as ‘‘information’’. But we should add now that our cotenable
information is not made only of truths,14 because ‘‘what people do not change when
they create a counterfactual alternative depends on their beliefs’’ (Byrne 2005: 10),
and believed falsities may get involved. Therefore, (the counterpart in our framework
of) what Lewis (1973) called Weak Centering should not hold in our semantics:
(Weak Centering) If w 2|A|, then w 2 f A(w).
13 What background is imported is constrained by what is relevant with respect to the explicit content.
Such relevance is difficult to pin down formally, but the intuitive insight is clear. Although you know that
the city of Brussels is composed of more than 1000 bricks, this is irrelevant with respect to your
imagining that you fail your logic class. Your mental representation is not about that. So you need not
import information about those bricks.
14 Information may be factive, as claimed by Floridi (2005). If so, it would not even be appropriate to
label as ‘‘information’’ what is imported in our exercises of imagination. The issue is controversial,
however. We can safely adopt a weak conception of semantic information as meaningful, well-formed
data which need not be truthful.
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This entails that if a world w realizes the explicit content of an act of imagination
[A], then w is one of the worlds in the set outputted by the selection function for
A. Even restricted to possible worlds, Weak Centering validates what we may call
imaginative modus ponens:
A, [A]B  ? B
If the explicit content of an act of imagination actually obtains, and it is
represented in that act that B, then B also obtains. This is wrong. We can import
false but cotenable relevant beliefs into our representation, as part of the CA. And
this can make us imagine falsities although A gets things right. For instance, you
imagine that Merkel is signing treatises in Brussels, [A], but you mistakenly believe
Brussels to be in France. you import the (relevant, cotenable) belief and you
imagine Merkel signing treatises in France, [A]B. A is true, but it does not follow
that B is.
Then even if we manage to impose a plausible closeness metric on worlds in the
form of a system of nested similarity spheres, we already know that this will not be
an even weakly centred system. The role of @ (for things imagined at @) is just to
fix the beliefs that are actually held (by the relevant conceiving agent), rather than
what actually is the case. Once this is done, @ steps out of the picture.
10 Primary Versus Secondary Conceivability?
I close by mentioning a question for further research, which I leave open for the
time being: are such imagination operators actually closer to subjunctive ceteris
paribus conditionals, or rather to indicatives? This is a major question which
deserves separate treatment in a further paper. I will limit myself to some tentative
considerations here.
It has often been remarked that the logic of the two kinds of conditionals is very
similar (both kinds fail Antecedent Strengthening, Transitivity, etc.). A key
difference is that what is cotenable with respect to indicatives is not made of facts,
but of beliefs (see Bennett 2003: 175–176). This would bring our ceteris paribus
imagination operators closer to indicatives, for the failure of imaginative modus
ponens above is due precisely to cotenability for them being tied to beliefs which
might be false.
Indicatives are connected to subjective probabilities, or degrees of belief, so
much so that according to some (including Bennett himself) one cannot even give a
truth-conditional semantics for them. But even if indicative ceteris paribus
conditionals lack truth values (which is controversial anyway), one should not
suspect that our ceteris paribus operators themselves lack genuine truth conditions,
and thus that the prospect of a truth-conditional semantics for them as sketched here
is hopeless. For authors like Bennett, indicatives lack truth values for they report or
describe nothing, although they express something about the (conditional) belief
arrangements of those who utter them. But a formula of the form [A]B is exactly a
report of the mental state of the relevant conceiving agent: it reports that the agent
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imagines that B (in a certain context) in the act of imagination whose explicit
content is given by A; and such a report may be true or false.
I suspect that our variably strict operators may behave in a way more similar to
indicatives, or to subjunctives, depending on how the ceteris paribus worlds are
selected on the basis of some similarity metric for them. It might be, that is, that two
different kinds of similarity or closeness are in play here. None of this surfaced in
this paper, because I have introduced no similarity metric.
I conjecture that one may impose two different similarity structures, which would
account for two different kinds of conceivability or imagination in the sense of
Chalmers’ (2002): a primary conceivability where we imagine a certain scenario as
a candidate for actuality, and which works in a way more similar to indicative
ceteris paribus conditionals; and a secondary conceivability where we imagine a
certain scenario as counterfactual, and which works closely to subjunctive
conditionals in the sense of the relevant worlds similarity structure, although it
differs (at least) in that Weak Centering is lacking. If such a development of the
semantics presented above is feasible, it may nicely connect the framework to
mainstream debates about conceivability and two-dimensional semantics (Garcia-
Carpintero and and Macia 2006). Whether the development is feasible hinges on the
crucial issue flagged above: how to account for world similarity in models of ceteris
paribus imagination that use possible and impossible worlds. I will thus not venture
here into a more detailed discussion of indicative vs. subjunctive and primary vs.
secondary, because the world similarity problem has been intentionally left out of
this paper, in view of subsequent work.
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